Distressed Valuation Not Justified – Penn West Petroleum (PWE)

Summary
PWE is one of the largest conventional oil and natural gas producers in Canada. For years, its previous manager increased debt to pursue high production growth without cost in mind. New management took control in mid-2013 and started the plan to bring down debt and improve efficiency. But share price declined 80% in the past year as oil price and legacy problems hurt the company during the change. However, strong management with focus on low-cost oil assets will help PWE survive the oil downturn and current distressed valuation is not justified.

Investment Thesis

  • Strong Management and well turn around execution
    The new managements took control in mid-2013. Since then, they have achieved all of their stated targets in operation improvement. Non-core assets of over CAD1bn were disposed to bring down debt from CAD3.2bn to ~CAD2bn. Annual cash cost decreased CAD400m. Previous practice of expensive acquisition immediately stopped. They cut 25% of the workforce and turned the company to focus on efficiency. Management voluntarily disclosed an accounting issue in mid-2014 and finished a full review by Oct 2014.
  • Misunderstanding about true earnings power of the company
    Due to previous management’s expensive acquisition, current non-cash cost was inflated and did not reflect the long term cost structure of the company. Management’s decision since 2013 to focus on 3 conventional oil assets prepared the company for the low oil price. Unlike shale oil companies, which need to constantly drill new wells to keep production, conventional players can rely on old wells for more years. PWE has a total reserve of 487MM boe with current annual production of ~10% reserve. The long term total cost will gradually decline to around $30/bbl and ensure the survival during the downturn.
  • Debt problem exaggerated, equity and bond valuation mismatch
    Debt is the main concern in the market for PWE. Net debt/EBITDA may temporarily breach the debt covenant. However, management has reached an agreement with bondholder to relax covenant in next 2 years. Considering the 30% Net debt/Equity ratio, strong reserve base and further cost structure improvement, the company has enough room to cover the debt. Moreover, Pennwest’s bonds are traded above par at a healthy yield while equity is at a distressed level.

Valuation
PWE is currently trading at distressed level with EV/Reserve at $5.3/bbl, significantly lower than $15/bbl finding cost and its historical average of $18/bbl. Price target of $3.5 is based on $9/bbl EV/Reserve exit downturn in 2 years with 20% of reserve decline. However, it is very likely for EV/Reserve to eventually reverse back to above cost of finding in the long term.
PWE Financials

Company Overview

Penn West Petroleum (Pennwest) is one of the largest conventional oil and gas producer in Canada. The company was founded in 1979 with headquarter in Calgary, Alberta. In 2005, Pennwest, along with many other Canadian oil and gas producers, transformed itself into a Canadian Royalty Trust which distributed all income to avoid federal income tax. However, in 2011, Pennwest eventually converted back into normal company after government regulation.

Pennwest mainly operated in three conventional oil & gas field in Cardium, Viking and Slave Point with an annual production of around 100k BOE/d. At the end of 2014, Pennwest’s net proven and probable reserve totaled at 487m BOE.

PWE Production Breakdown

Why this is a good company
Because the oil price cannot be set by any individual company, the E&P business is generally a price taker and the success is based on low unit cost. The combination of low-cost-to-produce asset and a strong management that focus on efficiency is the formula to long term value creation.

  • New management team with a strong track record
    The current management team took control in mid-2013. It has a very strong track record of creating long term value for shareholder and is well-known for its efficiency orientation. Since 2013, underlining operating performance has improved significantly. Cash run rate has been coming down dramatically, drilling time has been cut in 3 major plays and most importantly uneconomic production has been shut down. The management has adopted a shrink-improve-expand process and further improvement is likely to be realized in the coming years. Core management team member include:
    Chairman – Richard George: Previously CEO of Suncor Energy from 1991 to 2012. He built the company from a small regional producer into Canadian’s largest energy company with over $50bn market cap. During his 21 year period, company generated a compound annual return of above 20%.
    CEO – David Roberts: Previously COO of Marathon Oil from 2008 to 2013. He was in charge of the E&P business of Marathon Oil and was good at improve efficiency. Under his management, Marathon oil recorded improving operating matrix constantly from 2008.
  • Low cost to produce conventional oil assets
    Conventional crude oil in Canada competed with both US shale oil producers from Bakken and Cushing. The growing supply in US shale oil production has made the Alberta crude to trade at significant discount to WTI. However, even with the price discount and larger transportation fees, the conventional producer from Canada still has advantages over its US shale competitors: 1) Cost to produce for conventional oil can be as low as under $30/bbl while shale producers usually has a higher than $50/bbl cost; 2) Conventional oil producers does not need to continuously drill new wells to keep production relatively stable while shale players face a much faster production decline; 3) As more light crude oil can move to new refinery capacities from the Gulf area, the competition will gradually ease and the discount is likely to shrink. As an of the largest conventional producer, Pennwest is set to be more competitive in a low oil price.
    PWE Competition Map

Why it is undervalued
Pennwest stock price has declined over 80% in the past year due to market perception of it as a high-cost producer, concern of its debt level, and a self-revealed accounting issue. However, a detailed look at the fundamentals shows the concerns resulted from market misunderstanding and exaggeration. The company’s distressed level valuation is not justified.

  • Market perception of it as a high-cost producer
    Although Pennwest sits on top of an attractive conventional oil & gas assets, previous management did a poor job by overpaying on the acquisitions to grow production without cost in mind. New management took control in mid-2013 and immediately stop the bad practice. The disposition of non-core assets and 25% reduction in work force set the stage for Pennwest to convert to a low cost producer. However, the previous expensive acquisition (Finding & Development cost which is capitalized) and the short term decline in production masked the true long term earnings power of the company. Furthermore, the decline in oil price has exaggerated the market misunderstanding. The new focus on self-developed reserve in low-cost area will result in total cost per barrel to decline to around $30/bbl. This will give Pennwest a significant advantage over its main competitors, the US shale oil producer.

PWE finding and development

  • Concerns of the debt level
    Another negative impact from previous poor management is the debt used to support growth. Under current market situation, market is correct to worry about the debt of the company. However, there is a huge mismatch emerging from the debt and equity market for Pennwest. The stock price is clearly trading at distressed level and indicate a high probability of default while all company’s debts are trading above par and at a healthy yield.

PWE Stock performance

After taking control in mid-2013, the new management started debt reduction through selling non-core and high-cost assets. Net debt level has declined $1bn in the past year. Absolute debt/equity level is not high at 30% but the concern is on debt to EBITDA level. The ratio is likely to temporarily breach the covenant of 3x due to oil price decline. But company has already reached an agreement with the banks to waive the requirement in the short-term. And for the long-term, the cost saving method combined with $1.7bn unused credit line can help company go through the downturn.

PWE Net Debt

  • Accounting problem
    In Q214, management voluntarily disclosed a minor accounting problem. Some expenses were misallocated to CAPEX/royalties for 2012/13 period and management team initiated a full scale internal accounting practice review. The review has been completed in Sep 2014 with operating cash flows of 2012/13 restated lower by 5%/7%. But reserves and other major balance sheet items were reaffirmed by a third party. It ensured the company a clean start under the new management. However, the damage has been done just before the oil price decline and this is also a contributor to current lower valuation.

Valuation & Comps

Normally, it costs around $15/bbl to find new Proven and Probable reserves especially for light crude oil. Pennwest used to be traded in the past decade at an average valuation of $18/bbl EV/Reserve which reflect reasonable return above finding cost. Currently, the stock is trading at only $5.3/bbl EV/Reserve which in the long-term is not sustainable. The base case price target of $3.5 is derived assuming $9/bbl EV/Reserve exit downturn in 2 years with 20% of reserve decline during the period. The bear case PT of $1.6 assumes 30% decline in reserve before oil market stabilize. And the Bull case assume 10% reserve decline but a reverse back to $15 finding cost for EV/Reserve.   PWE EV Reserve

Besides the low EV/Reserve vs. historical average, Pennwest has the lowest multiple among major Canadian E&P companies, even lower than those companies with worse balance sheet and less light crude reserve.

Table 2: Comps of valuation, operating and financials among Canadian oil E&P

PWE Comps of valuation 

Conclusion
Pennwest, with its strong management and conventional oil assets, is severely mispriced because of misunderstanding of its true cost structure and exaggerated concern over debt problem. The oil price decline, management strategy to shrink operations with unhedged oil and legacy accounting problem also helped create this distressed level valuation. In the long run the EV/Reserve is very likely to reverse to underlying finding cost. On top of the misprice, Pennwest also has the potential to turnaround and become a long term winner in a low oil price environment.

Long Term Value Creation from Stable Business – TAKKT AG

Summary
TAKKT AG is a Germany-based B2B direct marketing retailer. It helps business customers to purchase specialized equipment for plants, warehouses, offices and food chains from over 1,000 suppliers. It facilitates the purchases by providing catalogs, online marketing, logistics, procurement and advice. Since its IPO in 1999, the stock has consistently outperformed the index and its peers’ because of efficient capital allocation and carefully maintained economic moat. Current valuation of 14x 2014 P/E provided an attractive entry point for investors to enjoy long term value creation.

Investment Thesis

  • 15 years’ track record of efficient capital allocation; ROE stable at ~20%
    Since 1999, TAKKT has engaged in 6 acquisitions, 3 divestments and 1 stock buyback. Management followed a strict rule in the acquisitions targeting above 20% equity return under conservative assumptions. It also treated buyback as an investment decision under the same rules. In Feb 2009, company conducted a tender offer to buy back 10% of total shares at a very attractive price. Moreover, TAKKT made 3 divestment to shed low return businesses, and a cumulative dividend has amounted to above 80% of IPO price.
  • Strong economic moat with high margin
    TAKKT operated at a higher margin than its competitors and the margin difference was widening after the financial crisis in 2008. That was mainly caused by: (1) Economic of scale and diversification that provided cost advantage; (2) High value proposition to customers from recommendation to customers using accumulated knowledge; (3) Focus on building a portfolio of leaders in niche market. Moreover, TAKKT also enjoyed an extremely fragmented suppliers and customers. Considering the high initial investment to build logistics and acquire suppliers/customers, the high margin is well protected.
  • Market priced different earnings and management quality at same multiple
    Takkt and its major competitor Manutan is trading at a similar level of 14x 2014 PE. While there is no discount on multiple, the earnings quality of Takkt is much better because they were derived from high margin business with protection from economic moat. And the management team in Takkt showed superior ability in capital allocation to create value for the past 15 years. Market failed to reflect the long term predictability of earnings by focusing too much on short-term performance.
  • Valuation
    In past 15 years, TAKKT stock generated a CAGR of 10% without multiple expansion. A stable management with its strict focus on return is likely to maintain a 20% ROE. Current valuation of 14x 2014 PE is attractive for investors to enjoy the long term compound return from efficient capital allocation and an improved business portfolio. Potential return can be in a range of 10%-18% CAGR in 5-10 years.

    TAKKT Financials and Margins

Company Overview
TAKKT AG is a Germany-based B2B direct marketing retailer. The company is operated under decentralized corporate structure with Group Company making capital allocation decision and regional company with its own brand making operating decision.

Chart 1: Company structureCompany Structure
Source: Company data

TAKKT built its business portfolio in diversified sectors across US and Europe. Revenue from Europe accounted for just above 50% of total revenue while profit from Europe stood at 70%.

Chart 2: Diversification of regions and product rangesdiversification
Source: Company data

In terms of the management, Takkt had a very stable team and well managed transition history. From 1999 to 2009, Georg Gayer was the CEO of the company and Felix A. Zimmermann was CFO. They made most of the capital allocation decisions during that period. Felix A. Zimmermann, now 47, became CEO in 2009 after Georg Gayer’s retirement. Since then, there was no change the way the company made capital allocation. In the company’s Board, most of the members came from Takkt’s controlling shareholder Franz Haniel & Cie. GmbH (50.2% of total shares).

15 years’ outperform without multiple expansion
Since Takkt’s IPO from 1999, it has achieved CAGR of 10% in the past 15 years. The stock return was slightly better than DAX and S&P500 while significantly outperformed its peers in the industry both from US and Europe. Moreover, it is currently trading at 14x PE, same as it was in 1999. The consistent outperform was not a coincidence or deviation from mean but rather a result from carefully managed economic moat and disciplined capital allocation.

Stock Performance

Sustainable economic moat
B2B marketing for equipment is a very competitive market with several big listed companies but more regional small private players. However, Takkt has consistently achieved the highest margin and ROE in the industry.

ROE Comparison

  • Value proposition & competitive advantage

Consistent higher margin is obviously a good thing for the company. But a more important question is where is the higher margin coming from and whether it will be sustainable. In Takkt’s case, the difference in margin can be explained mainly by gross margin difference which reflected higher value proposition to customers. Higher customer value comes from several areas: (1) A wide range of products to choose from, (2) Recommendation from Takkt on the quality of product from past experience, (3) Customized solutions to meet customers’ unique demand, (4) Longer warranty periods, and (5) Faster and flexible delivery. All those advantages were supported by some kind of moat that protect competitors from competing away high margins.

Takkt's advantage and moat

Because Takkt is the biggest operator in all its subsectors, it can provide a one-stop shop for certain industries. With the accumulation of past user experience, Takkt is in the best position to help customers on purchasing. The shared logistic services and IT systems further enhance the competitive advantage because Takkt as a whole is the biggest company in the industry. (3-times the size of the second company by market cap).

  • Sustainable moat with high margin

Although the direct marketing business is a very competitive industry, Takkt’s management and strategy has done a great job of keeping its advantage for a long time. Part of the reason is it is hard for companies in different subsectors to compete out of their original businesses. The initial investment to build relationship with fragmented suppliers and customers was very high. And considering Takkt’s deliberately picking of industries with ~5% organic growth, it is not attractive for new companies to enter the market.

Another critical part to protect the moat is management’s philosophy on capital allocation. Company has strictly followed the rules to acquire successful operators in the niche market. And it targets to get different knowledge on customers or industry from the acquisitions. Through this, Takkt is consistently looking to widen its moat and ensure that it can earn an excess margin and return.

Capital allocation
Since 1999, TAKKT has engaged in 6 acquisitions, 3 divestments and 1 stock buyback. Management followed a strict rule in the acquisitions targeting above 20% equity return under conservative assumptions.

Table 2. Historical capital allocation decisionsHistorical Capital Allocation Decision      

  • Acquisition; TAKKT’s acquisitions usually included below terms: (1) Successful leader in a niche market; (2) Previous owners continued to run the department independently while infrastructures like logistics and order systems were consolidated; (3) Additional knowledge of new market or leading ways of marketing can be learned and applied to more groups; (4) Valuation of ~10x P/E with high EBITDA margin
  • Divestment; All 3 divestments from Takkt in the past decade were to sell its legacy businesses that have a permanently lower margin prospect and growth potential. During the divestment process, resources were freed for management to make additional acquisition. But the resulted slow revenue growth masked true growth potential of the company.
  • Buyback; Takkt treated buyback activity correctly as a reinvestment decision. Rather than making open-ended buyback commitment, Takkt preferred to use tender offer to buyback stocks at attractive price. In Feb 2009, the company bought 10% of shares using tender offer at the price of EUR7.9. The decision also contributed to long term outperform comparing to competitors’ buying not-that-good businesses to support revenue at the same period.
  • Dividend; Takkt also promptly returned cash to shareholder when there were no attractive investment opportunities in 2007, 2008 and 2011. The management showed a strong track record of capital allocation. Investment in Takkt can be partly seen as a delegation of investing decisions in the direct marketing area targeting 20% ROE. Management is very predictable and this provided solid protection for the downside.
  • Outlook; Management will continue to execute similar strategies in the future. With all divestments of legacy businesses finished in 2015, organic growth of 5% can be expected in the long run. Further growth can be realized from acquisitions. Considering the natural of the industry where a lot of small successful family owned companies dominated individual niche markets, there will be ample opportunities for Takkt to invest.

Valuation & Comps
In the past 15 years, TAKKT stock generated a CAGR of 10%, in line with book value growth. Current valuation of 14x 2014 PE is attractive for investors to enjoy the long term compound return from efficient capital allocation and an improved business portfolio. Possible CAGR can be at least 10% in the next 5 to 10 years.

Table 3. Expected return
Expected return

In addition, below is a DCF valuation table based on 8.3% WACC and 2% terminal growth rate for reference.         

Table 4. DCF
 DCF               
Source: Company data